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Most of them were industrial engineers, members of the National Association of Industrial Engineers (Asociaci on Nacional de Ingenieros Industriales, ANII), 2 who usually had undergone postgraduate studies in France. 3 Earlier in the year, they had set up informal contacts to assess the state of computing training and industry in Spain and discuss the establishment of formal structures for supporting professionalization, which was a challenging action under civic-rights limiting Franco's dictatorship. Participants in the meeting came to the idea of creating an association by using a legal loophole; that is, by establishing a so-called Technical Commission of Computing (Comisi on T ecnica de Inform atica) as part of the ANII. The resulting group was called Association of Information Technology Technicians (Asociaci on de T ecnicos de Inform atica, ATI), and became the first Spanish association representing computer professionals.
The main goals of the ATI were expressed in a chart, which stated that it would "facilitate among partners the interchange of experiences and information about computing techniques;" "create working groups to perform work or research on these topics;" "perform demonstrations, seminars (see Figure 1 ), and conferences on these topics, cooperate with others organizers, and publish with and assist the publication of the results;" "promote dissemination in Spain of computing techniques;" and "make contacts with national and international associations related to establish collaborations within these topics." It also stressed that the association was "committed to nonprofit activities and independent of any commercial entity." In a market dominated by IBM, the foundation members of the ATI wanted to build an abstract knowledge independent from any manufacturer. This choice was reflected in the adoption of a new name for their discipline, choosing the word inform atica instead of electronic data processing, a term closely associated with IBM. They also added "technicians" in their name, a word expressing their commitment to the building of a specific knowledge and to professionalization. 4 All computing professionals were invited to join the association; it was not mandatory to have a University degree, but only 2 years of experience in computing. Six years later, by the end of 1973, the ATI counted 556 members and fulfilled its training support dimension by organizing approximately 10 courses and seminars per year. In December 1974, under the determined impulse of Julian Marcelo-Cocho, the association further advanced in this goal by establishing its own publication, the journal Nov atica, which initially appeared as a supplement of Novatecnia, the journal of the ANII (see Figure 2) .
The expansion of ATI was simultaneous with a political transition in Spain from a military dictatorship to a constitutional democracy, as well as an economic one resulting from the impact of 1973 on the Spanish economy, and a cultural and social one inspired by events in European countries. 6 A climate of social unrest, political change and unleashed activism was a fertile ground for the entanglement of professional and political claims, to which members of the ATI were not spared. The strong links between Spanish leftist movements opposed to the regime, and the emergence of computing as a profession can be revealed from the selection of topics in Nov atica's articles, covering the creation of trade unions, improvement of salaries, equal rights for women and handicapped people, or the respect of regional languages and medical coverage, and, indeed, in the editorials, which called for the defense of democracy and reflected upon the ethical problems of electronic data processing.
This interaction between the institutionalization of computing and political involvement bears similitude, but also important differences, with other cases analyzed by academic historians. For example, Slava Gerovitch has studied the institutionalization of computing in the Soviet Union, showing that soviet cybernetics became part of a social movement for radical reform in science and society, criticized under Stalin as a weapon of imperialist ideology and rehabilitated under Khrushchev to be hailed as a "science in the service of communism." For Gerovitch, these changes revealed the changing power relations within the scientific community and in the political role of scientists and engineers in Soviet society. 7 In the United States, Paul Edwards has shown how computing enabled the formation and pursuit of Cold War politics, and how computer metaphors shaped American intellectual life. 8 Also regarding the American case, the Fred Turner history of the Whole Earth Catalog has shown how the counterculture movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s accompanied the transformation of the image of computing from a Cold War product to a guarantee of individualism and democracy. 9 Finally, Eden Medina studied the importance of Cybersyn, a project led by the British cyberneticist, Stafford Beer, for Salvador Allende, democratic president of Chile from 1970 until the coup d' etat of 1973. The aim of Cybersyn was to help implement the transition of Chile's economy from capitalism to socialism, and was instrumental to avoid the collapse of economy during a truck divers' strike in 1972.
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Our case study provides an opportunity to connect some of the themes evoked in this literature with classical approaches about the process of professionalization taken from the history and sociology of professions. A good departure point can be Abbott's "ecological" view, which explains the emergence of a profession from processes of differentiation within occupations, its configuration by means of struggle at different levels (the workplace, culture, public opinion, and legal and administrative rules), and its consolidation through conflict between different technical communities mediated by jurisdictional claims.
11 Inspired by this view, Nathan Ensmerger has studied the "failed" professionalization of computing in the 1960s, a period characterized by the unsuccessful efforts by computer programmers to achieve "control over entry into the profession, and the adoption of a shared body of abstract occupational knowledge."
12 However, they also resisted the desire of corporate managers to transform them in a standardized, tractable workforce. According to Ensmerger, the resulting, undefined situation of computer programmers arising from this conflict leads to characterize them as technicians, which Stephen Barley define as a category constituted by white- collar workers with scientific or engineering training, but who also value craft knowledge. These workers have an important role as mediators between the technologic and social architectures of the organizations, conducting sophisticated scientific and mathematical analyses, and are granted much autonomy by their employers. 13 Information technology (IT) workers in Spain encountered similar problems, but in this case the move to professionalization encouraged by the government policy was perceived as a way to disempower and control the computing workforce, and, therefore, ATI developed a strong opposition via ANSAPI and Nov atica.
14 In this case, the adoption of the name "technician" to describe their work was instrumental in their fight against corporations and the State, by helping them to keep away a "professionalization" that, from their point of view, meant control and division of the computing labor force. 15 Here, the main difference with the American case studied by Ensmerger is the key role of the State in the definition of professions, and the instability of the political background due to the end of the dictatorship and the transition to a democratic regime. As we will see, the political involvement of the leaders of the IT community was strong in Spain during the transition to democracy, but restrained to local settings and short time spans. Once democracy was established, we found ATI members as university lecturers or well-positioned professionals in the IT industry, but none of them as politicians. After being very prominent for some time, political discourses eventually faded and left place to standard discipline-building activities, mostly focused on university institutionalization and professional lobbying.
To show this gradual transition, we focused on the first years of ATI, 16 which we have just described as the main professional association of computer professionals in Spain. By closely following the activities and debates in which this association was involved, we aimed to reveal the ties between the political context and the process of professionalization of computing in late Francoism. The argument unfolds in three parts: first, we described the Spanish political context in late 1970s and attempted to understand the activities of ATI's supporting computer professionals' rights. Then, we focused on the involvement of ATI in the creation of the first university studies in computing in Barcelona. Finally, we studied the lobbying activities of ATI with political parties and its influence in legislation, and especially in the inclusion of a reference to computing in the Spanish constitution.
Politics, Labor and Computing in Franco's Spain
The creation of the ATI and its early activities can be better understood by taking into account the context of labor regulations and the expansion of computing in Spain by the mid-1970s. In the early 1970s, the country was a political anomaly in Since the establishment of General Franco's rule, labor relationships were initially molded on fascist and Nazi models, which banned free trade unions and established a state-controlled organization. The Spanish Union Organization (Organizaci on Sindical Española, OSE, also known as Sindicato Vertical) regulated the relations between workers and their employers by controlling and monitoring workers, served the state's surveillance goals by informing the government when a problem occurred in production, and performed bureaucratic tasks on labor administration, such as collecting economic statistics. 18 The OSE, interestingly, was a key target of the underground Spanish Communist Party and its associated trade union Comisiones Obreras, CCOO (Workers' Commissions), which abandoned armed resistance since the early 1950s and tried to undermine the regime from inside, by infiltrating its members as representatives in the organization. 19 The role of OSE in structuring labor relationships, which was tightly enforced during the autarkic period, began to deteriorate when the regime's economic policies evolved in the late 1950s, in particular with the establishment in 1958 of a new law allowing collective agreements (Ley de Convenios Colectivos), 20 which allowed for the existence of negotiation inside companies. Indeed, the Civil Code was reformed in 1965 following an important wave of miners' strikes in 1962 and international pressure. Strikes, which were strictly forbidden in early Francoism-they were assimilated to the crime of seditionwere decriminalized if they were strictly related to workers' economic demands. 21 In relation to computing, the Spanish market was dominated by machines produced in the United States. In the autarky period (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) , IBM (and before, although not yet with that name) almost monopolized the Spanish market. IBM stated its supremacy in the Spanish market in three legs that complemented each other perfectly; the quality and comprehensiveness of its systems, which took into account the whole life product, from presales services to the installation and start-up 22 ; the aggressiveness of its marketing campaigns, which had an important echo in Spanish newspapers 23 ; and its multinational policy, that officially rejected bribery and compromise with authoritarian regimes, but also knew how to please the governments installing new factories or sale offices. 24 Most companies gradually replaced their electromechanical tabulating machines by electronic models, such as the IBM 609 (continuation from 604, but transistorized) and Bull 300. By 1952, Guillermo Turinger's Company began to sell Bull machines, the first two being acquired by the government administration in 1953. Bull Gamma 3 fought against the IBM 604 and IBM's market share fell to 70% to 80% by the end of the decade, still with tabulating machines.
In 1959, the Spanish government presented a stabilization plan to the International Monetary Fund, which abandoned hopes of autarkic development and eased the import of foreign technology. 25 As a result, Spanish companies had access to foreign goods at prices that, on average, were halved. 26 Economic stabilization boosted Spanish industrialization in general and computerization in particular. Between 1959 and 1961, the number of tabulating machines increased by 50%. 27 The first computers were imported in the late 1950s to be implemented in Spanish public corporations, such as the National Railway Company (Red Nacional de Ferrocarriles Españoles, RENFE), which acquired an IBM 650 in 1958, and the National Nuclear Research Institution (Junta de Energ ıa Nuclear, JEN), which acquired a UNIVAC UCT in 1959. However, these big computers were not representative of the business model followed by Spanish companies in the process of mechanization (a word commonly used before the IBM-inspired expression "electronic data processing" spread), as it was focused on gradually replacing accounting machines by electronic versions, and expanding the market to new kinds of users (see Figure 3 ).
An example of this strategy was IBM 1401, which was presented at the Barcelona trade fair in 1961, and its subsequent competitor, the Bull Gamma 10.
28 By mid-1960s, IBM had recovered its dominant position, achieving a maximum share of 90% of the market. In the 1970s, the emergence of new competitors (NCR, Siemens), the highest penetration of old (Univac, Honeywell-Bull), and especially the change in purchasing policies of banks, the state and public companies reduced this quota. Still, IBM was by large the first in the ranking, both in revenues and in number of installed machines, followed by Univac (in revenues) or Honeywell-Bull (in equipment). As Figure 4 shows, the rest of manufacturers represented a few pieces of the market. Computers also spread in sectors of Spanish industry, such as banking or telecommunications, leading to the development of a community of workers involved in computing tasks that, by 1971, attained 11,551 people. 29 As shown in Figure 5 , most of them were assistants and manual operators, including an important-and much feminized-workforce of keypunchers.
The Americanization of the computer market in Spain led to training structures for new professionals in computing very similar to those developed in the United States one decade previously. 30 In Spain, as well as in the United States, computer manufacturers established and controlled training practices, making entry tests for potential recruits, running training courses and designing the syllabi. Indeed, as in the United States, manufacturers alone could not produce enough trained programmers to keep up with industry's needs, leading to increasing salaries and programmers' claims for professional recognition. Fast computerization put workers of Spanish data centers in a good bargaining position, and consequently they enjoyed a situation similar to their American counterparts 10 years earlier: decent salaries, relative autonomy, and easy mobility in a context in which headhunting was quite common. Situated in an independent space between blue and white collar workers, they mastered an art-programming-that few people could understand inside the company. From the companies' point of view, electronic data processing was considered as a tool critical for the modernization, automation, and reduction of costs, and they did not promote any division of labor or professionalization among computer workers at least until the early 1970s, when the first collective agreements listed were signed and established different computer categories.
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In this context, founding members of the ATI shared a concern for legitimizing their profession, and to get some autonomy from hardware manufacturers. This desire of independence was expressed in the two main points of the general regulations of the: improved training, which meant learning programming techniques independently from any manufacturer, and defense of better labor conditions. In this respect, it is important to remember that the ATI was born in Barcelona, which was not only one of the most important industrial centers of Spain (see Figure 6 ), counting a thriving community of computer technicians (see Figure 7 ), but also a highly mobilized society in terms of activism and opposition to the dictatorship.
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Many of ATI's members were active in the defense of computing workers' rights during the late Francoism period. In the late 1960s, some of them infiltrated the OSE through its "diverse activities" branch. In December 1969, the regime counteracted this move by creating the National Autonomous Union Association of Informatics Professionals (Asociaci on Nacional Sindical Aut onoma de Profesionales de la Inform atica, ANSAPI), a union that had its headquarters in Madrid and was closely controlled by the regime: the members of its board were designed by the president of the diverse activities branch, Juan Garc ıa-Carr es. 33 However, in April 1972 the members of ATI who had started union activities were recognized as the board of the delegation of ANSAPI in Barcelona, which could be elected democratically. 34 This position allowed them to establish direct communication with the government and get information about ongoing regulating plans. On the other hand, it avoided tensions inside the ATI, shifting an important part of the political fight to the ANSAPI.
The early efforts of ANSAPI Barcelona were oriented against the Spanish government's plans to create an official professional guild (colegio profesional) of computer technicians, such as in other engineering professions, in which an official association membership was mandatory for all professionals and all members had to have a university diploma. 35 The reasons for this opposition can be found in an article published in Nov atica, which in 1975 included the translation of an article by Philip Kraft that described professional guilds as examples of a strategy to divide works, and as a danger to worker's collective action.
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This same argument also was expressed in a report evaluating the pros and cons of this new institution that concluded that it was created "to divide, to control, and to frame" computer professionals, and that strict membership requirements would introduce class distinctions among computer people. The second activity in which ATI and ANSAPI invested most efforts was the resistance to the Spanish government plans to regulate the training of computer professionals, which population was estimated to be approximately 45,000 people, which number could double by the end of the decade. 38 To regulate this envisaged growth, the Spanish government aimed to make of computing one of the main lines of its fourth "development plan." 39 This kind of instrument for macroeconomic planning had been conceived and implemented in the mid-1960s by mimicking the French "plans de modernization" created just after the Second World War, and were justified by the regime's new economic experts as a middle way between individual initiative and state planning. By the early 1970s, two development plans had been implemented in Spain (respectively, for the periods 1964-1967 and 1968-1971 ) and a third one (for the period 1971-1975) was on the run. 40 The last years of the regime coincided with discussions related to the fourth plan, for the period 1976 to 1979, which had to focus to some extent on the development of computing.
To implement the plan, a committee on computing was established by the ministry of planning and development (Ministerio de Planificaci on y Desarrollo), counting 64 members divided in 12 subgroups. 41 The composition of these committees provides an interesting picture of the leaders and structure of the computing community and the selection bias related to its proximity to the regime. For example, 89% of members of these committees lived in Madrid and the rest of them in Barcelona (including the president of ATI). Almost all participants from Madrid worked in the public sector (army, government, university, and public companies). In contrast, all members of Barcelona worked in private companies (two computer manufacturers, one from banking, one automobile manufacturer, and one from a software company). 42 As resulting of these discussions, one institution, Madrid's Instituto de Inform atica, emerged as a potentially important instrument to put the new computing profession under state control. Established by decree in 1969, 43 the institute had officially the objective of coping with the "constant increment of electronic computers installed in the country."
44 Independent of universities, its courses on computing followed the example of the British Computer Society professional grades, established in 1968, 45 and merely provided validation and certification of the grades acquired by professionals. In 1971, its curriculum was structured in 5 years, allowing for different grades: application programmer, system programmer, application analyst, system analyst, and system technician, the five categories prevailing at IBM at the time. 46 The creation of the Instituto de Inform atica triggered a debate on the need of legitimizing computer work as a profession. The institute's curriculum could have been a step towards professionalization, but the method established to regulate the access to the different categories in the computing profession had no consensus inside the profession: professionals felt they had been excluded and that, instead of fulfilling their aspirations, it hindered them. In fact, it can be argued that this climate of opposition was instrumental for the creation of the Catalan branch of ANSAPI: in summer 1971, the ATI had addressed an article to all computer professionals about the government plans to make the Instituto de Inform atica a key element in professional training. This document, signed by Albert Coromines, 47 was followed in autumn 1971 by a letter of complaint to the Minister of Education, announcing the activation of ANSAPI Barcelona, which had its foundational assembly in Barcelona in April 1972. The proceedings of this meeting showed that the first decision to be implemented was to take legal actions against the Instituto de Inform atica, by arguing that 85% of computer people would be out of the profession according to the criteria of the institute. 48 The second one, in the same spirit, was to get collective agreements with companies to introduce computer labor categories without reference to the degrees implemented by the Instituto de Inform atica.
A second front in ATI's fight against the institute was to offer alternative training courses to IT technicians. Organized by the socalled "ATI's technical sections," they consisted of seminars and conferences in the classrooms of the Engineering School of Barcelona about computer related topics, which sometimes led to publications, and structured courses, not only oriented to commercial programming (which had more audience), 49 but also to programming theory. 50 Although the number of activities was not stable year after year, 51 lecturers often were of high profile, including foreign computer specialists. In fact, most of the seminaries dealt with very innovative programming techniques at the time, explaining the state of the art and sometimes confronting different methodology schools.
Opposition to the regime's plans regarding the profession and the climate of social unrest in late Franco's dictatorship contributed to the expansion of the ATI and to its engagement with current political controversies. For example, on October 1, 1975, while Franco was dying, far-right politic forces organized a violent street protest in Madrid to support the dictator. That same evening, six prominent members of the ATI decided to accelerate the creation of a delegation in Madrid the day after. 52 A total of 50 people, recruited by the president of ATI, Ramon Puigjaner and ATI's Secretary, Xavier Berenguer, who had moved from Barcelona, attended the first session. At the same meeting, an Interim Board was created, 53 and seven tentative rules were drafted, including one affirming ATI's independence of "any commercial entity." 54 In the following years, the ATI opened new locations and the number of its members grew dramatically (Figure 8) . By the beginning of 1977, a delegate group of ATI was created in Valencia with 20 initial members. This same year, the ATI's membership had risen to 898 members in Catalonia (which still was the association's center of gravity), 251 in Madrid, and 69 in the rest of Spain. 55 It included very different technical profiles, from manufacturers, to computer users, consultants, or public servants. According to early ATI's coordinator Julian Marcelo-Cocho, they were attracted by the aforementioned tensions about workers' representation, professional legitimacy, and training. 56 The activities of the ATI cannot be understood only as arising of a desire of professional legitimization, but they were framed by the turbulent political context of Spain's transition to democracy and in a particular vision of computing. Many of the proposals concerning computer technicians' professional role were informed by an egalitarian ideology and the guidelines traced by the communist trade-union CCOO. For example, the ATI refused computer workers to be segregated professionally by companies or governments from the rest of the workers, and defended collective negotiation between workers and company. In fact, there was a close articulation between ANSAPI and the CCOO: the ANSAPI coordinated the branches Oficinas y despachos (software companies) and CCOO the Metal branch (hardware companies), its members being elected successfully in the last trade unions elections under the Francoist regime. With the new democratic regime, ANSAPI disappeared and its members could move to the new legalized trade unions.
Another evidence of the determined political agenda of the board of the ATI, well aligned with the strategies and values of leftwing forces in late Francoism, can be obtained from the articles published in Nov atica, the association journal established in late 1974. The main goal of this publication was to act as a channel of expression of the association, and the themes addressed there were coherent with the objectives of ATI's foundation regulations. Nov atica not only included a section about computer science subjects, usually monographs, but also regular sections about social, technical, and news issues. In these sections the tight relationship between ATI and ANSAPI Barcelona also was reflected in a regular section called "Workplace" (Mundo Laboral), which acted as the ANSAPI newsletter since 1974. In this section, ANSAPI Barcelona tried to keep Spanish computer people aware of the profession problems in the near future, and informed them about any negotiation between companies and their Electronic Data Processing departments, new collective agreements, trade union elections, or strikes. We find in the journal, for example, some critiques to create specific unions for computer workers, and the recommendation that computer workers integrate the company's trade union to negotiate as a block with all other workers. At the same time, Nov atica's collaborators read American computer magazines and appropriated their concerns. 57 Labor activities were not the only politically charged subjects addressed by Nov atica, whose articles alternated between utopian and dystopian images of computing, either warning about the threats of computing or expressing hopes in a future where computers will be able to improve and dignify human work and human society in general. For example, the success of microcomputers over mainframes was considered positively, as it would imply less centralization and control that, under capitalism, will drive society towards an Orwellian dystopia. 58 Political events, such as the Chilean use of computers for repression in 1975, which was followed closely by Nov atica, 59 or the reference to French intellectuals, such as Benjamin Coriat, 60 reinforced dystopian views, but in general these images generally were more optimistic than contemporary critics of computing.
At a more local level, Nov atica was a forum for at least three main controversies involving the position of the ATI regarding regional languages (and more specifically Catalan), its relations with the communist party, and its position regarding data privacy. The first controversy, on August 1976, involved the reaction to the publication in the French journal Paris-Match of an interview with the Spanish Prime Minister and former member of Franco's government, Adolfo Suarez, in which he dismissed the possibility of using of Catalan language in Catalan schools. 61 At best, Suarez's declaration was a proof of ignorance from someone who had never been to Catalonia; at worst, it was an exercise of cynicism because the Francoist regime had tried, from the very beginning of the dictatorship, to restrict the use of Iberian languages other than Castilian. 62 This interview was reproduced, in Spanish, by the right-wing newspaper ABC a few days later. Almost immediately, several reactions took place. Newspapers, like La Vanguardia, in Barcelona, received complaint letters and many professional organizations (the Catalan Society of Chemical and Physics Science and Mathematics and the professional association of Industrial Engineers, among others) expressed their disagreement. 63 Members of the ATI also participated in the controversy with the publication of an article in Nov atica that argued for equal opportunities for Catalan, Basque, or Galician as for Castilian. 64 In reaction to this article, the Madrid publication Inform atica criticized the implication of the ATI in the controversy, considering that it played the role of a political party rather than of a professional association. 65 The journal asked rhetorically if ATI members were aware of their political membership and whether the ATI's rulers were elected according to professional or political criteria, and finally argued that speaking Catalan would decrease professional expectations of computer professionals.
ATI's reply was published in Nov atica's monographic on IT policy, in the section called "real time," usually written by Xavier Berenguer, which dealt with "computing and society" issues. The author remarked that other professional and scientific institutions had criticized Suarez's opinions, and they had not been accused of intromission on politics, that it was Informatica's blame not to be able to distinguish the difference of a professional association and a political party was, and that the ATI was a democratic institution, which democratically chose its board every two years. 66 In this same year, Nov atica included, indeed, an editorial refusing the perceived left-wing ideological bias of the magazine. The ATI claimed for the unity of all the different computer people organizations was necessary to deal with its collective problems: training, validation of degrees, and the lack of representation and not to translate the political fight methods to professional organizations. 67 On the other side, there is evidence that the association could not isolate itself from the left-wing political atmosphere prevailing in Catalonia. By 1977, coinciding with the first Spanish parliamentary elections in democracy, the communist Catalan Unified Socialist Party (Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya, PSUC) published a leaflet titled "Computing and Communists," in which the ATI was described as a collective heritage of all the professionals and workers in computing, in which "communists and others had invested a great deal of their energy," and computing was depicted as a key sector for consolidating democracy instead of a tool to increase the exploitation of the workers. The leaflet claimed for a better articulation of workers, strong professional associations, keeping the independence of the ATI, the hegemony of socialist ideas among professionals and workers of computing, and calling for reconsidering how computing should be in a democratic context. 68 The use of ATI's image concerned association members and it was discussed inside ATI's meetings. 69 Although board members were mostly supporters or even affiliates of the PSUC, they might have preferred the incident not to be repeated and to keep a more independent association. 70 In fact, only a few members of ATI were affiliated to the PSUC, even if they occupied important positions in the ATI's board, and they did not follow rigid consigns from the PSUC headquarters. The attachment to the party and the common solidarity arose principally from their common activism and participation in subversive activities against the dictatorship, and some of them had even met each as victims of the repressive policies of the regime.
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The third controversy in which the ATI was involved was related to the discussions about data privacy and computing in democracy, a debate that was especially relevant in the political transition. During Franco's dictatorship, several referenda had been held, but electoral fraud and vote rigging in favor of the regime were widespread. Thus, the organization of the first democratic elections required higher standards to legitimize the new regime, and that the first vote in liberty would be honest and transparent. 72 One of the elements invoked in assuring the honesty of the process was the use of electronic computers. State propaganda presented the computer in charge of counting the votes and processing the results (a Secoinsa-Telesincro IBER-2) as a guarantee of transparency. At the same time, Secoinsa took the opportunity to promote its machine, as the "referendum computer" in newspapers. 73 The reaction of the ATI to this campaign highlighted, however, that a computer was an instrument, and that the reliability of the system could be obtained only by allowing citizen's and political representatives in the voting and vote counting process. 74 By February 1976, in an extraordinary general assembly, ATI had already discussed these issues among others related to computing, society, and politics. As a result, the ATI approved a six-page long Manifiesto Inform atico, which provided a detailed picture of the development of computing in Spain. This manifesto discussed three main questions: the situation and needs of computer workers, the problems concerning training in computing, and the question of computing and individual liberty. In relation to this last aspect, the manifesto criticized Spain's technological dependence on the United States, which had been the main source of international support of Franco's regime, and asked that "democratic control mechanisms must exist to control the central data bank of the Administration." Otherwise, the rights of the private life of the citizens would be in serious danger. The ATI sent this manifesto to all major political authorities that had some decision power in computing affairs, from general directors to the King of Spain. 75 The interest of ATI in the question of computers and freedom reflected transnational debates on this issue, such as the discussions at the British Computer Society and the Association for Computer Machinery, which led to the establishment of codes of conduct and a growing literature on the threats on privacy in the computer age. 76 By 1975, members of ATI had argued in Nov atica against a computerized register of individuals in Spain, relating the Chilean experience of "counter-insurgency computing" that had helped to detect leftists after the coup d' etat in 1973. 77 The French project Safari, which aimed for the creation of a centralized database of personal data, also had a wide covering in Nov atica. The debates and conclusions of the national board created by France as a result of popular reaction against the project (Comision Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libert es, CNIL) also were closely followed in Nov atica.
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By 1977, the ATI tried to inform all the political forces about its concerns about the risks of using computers for processing and recollection of citizen's data. The ATI wanted the new political parties to take part in the development of computerization of Spain, 79 but also to make them aware of its potential misuses. Nov atica published two letters addressed to the Spanish Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez and to the Constitutional Commission, asking them to take into account the computing aspects of the use of individual data and the right of the society to access information. Indeed, Nov atica invited Catalan political parties with representation in the Parliament to use the journal as a board of discussion about computing and its sociopolitical implications. 80 The most remarkable success of this lobbying was the inclusion of an article in the draft of the Spanish Constitution, which asked that the use of computing should take into account the protection of "familiar and personal privacy." In the following negotiations, representatives of the center-right ruling party Uni on de Centro Democr atico tried to remove the article because they considered computers just as a specific type of instrument, 81 while other members of the commission arguing about its importance. Eventually, by an amendment of the Catalan representatives in the constitutional board, which had been subject to an intense lobbying from the ATI, the definitive version the Spanish Constitution included the following formulation: "The Law will restrict the use of computing to guarantee the familiar and personal privacy and citizens' honor and the full exercise of their rights." 82 The Association of Information Technology Technicians' lobbying had succeeded, possibly for the first time in history, to put a reference to computing in a national constitution.
Thus, political debate was prominent in Nov atica in the late 1970s. As shown in Figure 9 , the number of articles concerning political issues abounded, with important peaks in politically crucial moments, such as the referendum of political reform of 1976, the first elections in democracy, and the writing of the new Spanish Constitution (both in 1977). A last peak, in 1980, coincided with the election of the first autonomous government in Catalonia. Political issues were not disconnected from more technical discussions, as the leaders of the ATI repeatedly pointed out that projects, like building a national computing industry or the creation of high degree studies in computer science, 83 required not only state support, but also the framework of a democratic state based on the rule of law. 84 These turbulent years also reflected on the rapidly changing composition of the board: from December 1974 to August 1979, Nov atica had three directors (Julian Marcelo-Cocho, Josep Garriga, and Arturo Moreno), but from until April 1987 just one (Francisco Iribarme). 85 By then, lack of freedom and democracy was not a central problem anymore, computer science had achieved some recognition as a discipline and as a profession, and the political and social context had changed. The ATI achieved legal status in October 1979, the fourth development plan discarded by new democratic government, and most efforts of the members of the ATI were focused on the creation of computer science and engineering schools, to define standards of competency, and devote themselves to the advancement of their professional careers. 86 
Conclusion
This article has described the activities of the ATI in the 1970s, which combined demands for better working conditions in the computer industry and the promotion of academic programs in computer sciences with the lobbing to preserve privacy and personal freedom in the new Spanish Constitution. With political parties and unions forbidden by the regime, prominent members of the ATI found the association to be a space of resistance to the dictatorship. ATI clearly identified itself with progressive, left-wing opposition to the Francoist regime in Catalonia during the political transition to democracy, and its members were well aware that computer science had not only technical consequences, but also social ones. ATI's claims and commitments were coherent with wider cultural, economic and political changes in the country, and were inspired by the contemporary climate.
What did this mean for the professionalization of computing in Spain? As several researchers have noted, in Europe and the United States the Information Technology sector grew without professionalization, nor unionism, 87 and in the case of the United States studies by Ensmerger, this could be explained by internal rivalries within the computing community and the lack of active support from employers. The Spanish case, however, is different in the sense that it confronts different views of professionalization: on the one hand, a professionalization supported by the state and built on the exclusion of technicians noncertified by the Instituto de Inform atica; on the other, the inclusive view supported by the ATI, which established a border with other professions based on what people did, not what they had studied, avoiding any previous barrier and, therefore, refusing the creation of an official professional association. The view of the ATI also considered professionalization as a way of building skills and gaining independence from the manufacturers, and most of its efforts went to organizing courses and seminaries, which in the long run had an important role in the creation of the first university Spanish studies in Computer Science. Indeed, some of them spent the rest of their professional lives in the academic arena. However, once the studies were established, the framework regulating professions had been replaced by a more liberal one, and official professionalization no longer was feasible, leaving software engineers as the only Spanish engineers without official rights and duties by law.
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